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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Despite significant policy attention and political action, looked-after children 
and children with special educational needs and disabilities (SEND) remain some 
of the most vulnerable children in the country with their later life outcomes – 
social, educational and health related – remaining stubbornly poor. It is no 
coincidence that in Ofsted’s inspections of local authority children’s services 
departments from November 2013 to March 2016, three-quarters were given 
one of the two bottom ratings: ‘requires improvement’ or ‘inadequate’.1 These 
failings have profound impacts on the lives of children and young people.  
Two sets of pressures are putting children’s services departments under 
considerable strain. First, demand for children’s social care is rising. Between 
2008 and 2015, local authorities saw a 22 per cent rise in referrals and a 16 per 
cent increase in the number of children in care.2 It is not only the volume of 
demand but the kind of demand that is exerting pressure: the needs of looked-
after children are becoming more complex, and the introduction of Education, 
Health and Care plans (EHCPs), although a positive move forward, require local 
authorities to think more creatively about how they will meet the needs of 
children with SEND. Second, local authorities are facing continued and severe 
cuts to their budgets. Between 2011/12 and 2014/15, spending by England’s 
local authorities on children’s social care dropped by 18 per cent,3 resulting in 
staff reductions, increased workloads and less support for foster carers.  
In short, local authorities need to do more with less, and perhaps unsurprisingly 
many struggle to achieve the quality expected of them by the government and 
regulator. In some areas, outsourcing services to independent providers4 has 
been adopted as a potential solution, while in others, ‘externalising’ (setting up 
an independent trust) has been used. In some cases, these changes in 
governance have been forced on the local authority in response to what was 
seen as a failure in in-house delivery.  
However, there is some concern about the use of outsourcing in children’s 
services, particularly where it involves the use of for-profit providers. It is also a 
challenging undertaking to do well. Yet evidence suggests that when used 
correctly outsourcing has the potential to help local authorities deal with the 
pressures they face, drive up standards, and ultimately secure better outcomes 
for vulnerable children and young people. Pressures to do more with less are 
likely to be exacerbated now Britain has voted to leave the European Union – it 
is too soon to judge the full effects of the referendum result, but domestic 
funding will most likely be impacted, and planning in the short term will become 
more difficult. As pressure to improve outcomes under resource constraints 
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increases, it is likely that so too will the number of local authorities opting to 
outsource at least part of their children’s services. With this in mind, this report 
looks at domestic and international examples to identify some of the features 
common to outsourcing which seem to be working well, and possible pitfalls to 
avoid, to help inform this rapidly developing agenda. 
Methodology 
For this report we reviewed the literature relating to current policy and practice 
for children’s services, focusing specifically on innovations and responses to 
failure. We brought together two combined case studies that shed light on how 
outsourcing has been used to date in the UK and elsewhere – the independent 
trust model in the UK (as implemented in Slough and Doncaster) and the 
liberalisation of children’s services in the US (specifically looking at Kansas, 
Florida and Washington). We also held 12 semi-structured interviews (face to 
face and by telephone) with professional experts drawn from the voluntary, 
independent and statutory sectors in England, Wales and the US and received 
written feedback from a further two experts. In addition we collected evidence 
using a survey from members of the Children’s Service Development Group.5 
Finally, the project benefited from an expert advisory board,6 which met at the 
start of the project to comment on our methodology, and provided written 
feedback on our interim findings and this report.  
Findings 
We used our research to identify what outsourced children’s services that work 
well tend to have in common, and what pitfalls can prevent outsourcing in this 
area from working well. 
What works 
Having strong relationships  
Commissioner–provider relationships are critically important to the success of 
outsourced children’s services. Where these relationships were collaborative, 
with high levels of communication and trust, and mutual respect between both 
parties, outsourcing tended to achieve better outcomes. However, we identified 
further sets of relationships that impact on the success of outsourcing: 
relationships within local authorities, relationships between local authorities, and 
relationships between a given local authority, providers and the local 
community.  
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Using data effectively 
We found that commissioners who made strategic use of data tended to secure 
better outcomes for the children and young people in their area than those who 
did not. Three sets of data are needed: 
 data about populations, so commissioners can plan strategically and ensure 
they have the right number and kind of placements 
 data about costs, so that commissioners know how much their contracts are 
worth and can pay providers accordingly 
 data about the outcomes achieved by children and young people, so that 
commissioners can measure and monitor performance 
We found that a number of barriers can make it difficult for commissioners to 
use data effectively, including the expense involved in collecting them, the skill 
and time needed to analyse them, and the common error of making incomplete 
calculations using data about costs. 
Having clarity on outcomes 
There is little consensus on what precise outcomes local authority children’s 
services should be seeking to achieve. Yet our evidence shows that a strong 
focus on consensually agreed outcomes is a typical feature of local outsourced 
services that have worked well, giving all parties involved in planning and 
delivery a clear vision of what they should strive towards. Once decided, 
outcomes can be used in more and less ambitious ways: from using outcomes 
to measure and monitor performance; to commissioning according to outcomes 
– to give providers the freedom to improve outcomes in new and innovative 
ways; to paying providers according to how far they achieve them. The latter 
may improve the accountability of providers, but also presents them with 
greater risks and threatens financial sustainability, so outcomes-based payment 
mechanisms need to be used with caution and well planned.  
Pitfalls to avoid 
Underfunding 
Budget cuts have a significant impact on service quality. Not only do local 
authorities have less money to spend on services, cuts radically alter their 
commissioning practices. The fundamental impact of budget cuts is that they 
create a price-driven environment. Commissioners are forced to make decisions 
on the basis of cost rather than quality, data collection may become an 
unaffordable luxury, and there is a loss of sight on outcomes. All this serves to 
poison commissioner–provider relationships, can tempt local authorities to use 
in-house services (without any evidence that they are more cost-effective than 
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independent services) and reduces the range of placements offered (as standard 
placements are favoured over specialist offers, prompting independent 
providers to respond in kind). Ultimately, those who suffer most are vulnerable 
children and young people.  
Using outsourcing only in the context of failure 
Outsourcing has often been used in the US as a response to significant service 
failure. In contrast, the most frequently used response to children’s services 
failure in the UK has been ‘externalisation’ – the creation of an independent 
trust. Externalisation can enable children’s services to break from past failures, 
and frees them from the bureaucracy of the local authority. It should perhaps 
also be used as an opportunity to review outsourcing arrangements. However, 
our research suggests that outsourcing may not be the best response to failure, 
in that failure does not create the right conditions under which outsourcing 
succeeds. Commissioning outsourced services is complex, time-consuming and 
currently under-supported – it is not easy to get right at the best of times, and 
certainly not when a local authority is in crisis. We argue that there needs to be 
a more proactive attitude towards outsourcing – that it should be used to make 
improvements before a local authority has reached crisis point, so that the 
process can be properly planned. 
Poor planning 
Our research has shown that preparation is critical to the success of 
outsourcing. A decision to outsource should mark the start of a long period of 
planning, piloting and transitioning to the new system, and the evidence we 
have gathered shows that less successful outsourcing attempts were invariably 
rushed or poorly planned. A range of activities needs to be completed before 
the process begins, including mapping of the provider landscape, designing 
contracts, establishing outcomes, gathering costs data, and engaging with the 
local community. Pilots can be used to test how effective this preparation has 
been, as well as to allow providers to iron out any issues they experience from 
dealing with a higher volume of cases than before. Finally, there should be a 
transition period so that roles and responsibilities are transferred safely.  
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Recommendations 
Drawing on our research, we make the following five recommendations that 
would maximise the benefits of outsourcing in children’s services and minimise 
the pitfalls outlined above. 
 
For policy makers: 
1. Local authorities and central government should adopt a proactive 
approach to outsourcing, so it is seen not as a way of responding to 
failure or cutting costs, but as a way to improve outcomes in a planned 
and strategic manner.  
2. The government should bring back the Commissioning Support 
Programme. 
 
For policy makers and practitioners: 
3. A new national children’s social care forum should be created to bring 
people together to help develop outcomes-based strategies, and identify 
ways of cutting costs while maintaining quality and promoting innovation. 
 
For practitioners: 
4. Each local authority should facilitate a community-led exercise, in which 
local stakeholders define what desired outcomes ought to be for looked-
after children and children with complex needs in their area.  
5. Local authorities must prioritise data collection across their children’s 
populations, costs and outcomes as a central plank of market shaping, 
and commissioning or externalisation strategies. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This report looks at how outsourcing local authority children’s services can be 
used to improve outcomes for the most vulnerable children and young people 
in England and Wales: looked-after children and young people, particularly 
those with SEND. 
Providers of children’s services are operating in a changing landscape. Services 
are facing mounting pressures throughout the country and across sectors. There 
are a growing number of children with increasingly complex needs, and more 
children are entering the care system – at the same time as fewer leave care for 
a permanent placement because of the record low numbers of adoptions. While 
children’s services have hitherto been (relatively) protected within local authority 
budgets, it is highly unlikely that this protection can be sustained. High-profile 
failures in areas like Slough and Doncaster, which predated the financial 
downturn, show that children’s services are difficult to deliver at the best of 
times – let alone in an age of austerity.  
At the same time as these pressures mount, the way services are delivered 
continues to evolve. Third party contracts (or ‘outsourcing’), often to a plurality 
of different providers, account for an increasing proportion of local authorities’ 
expenditure. Although historically there has been a resistance to outsourcing 
children’s services, this too is now a growing trend. Following a consultation in 
2014, the government gave local authorities the freedom to outsource children’s 
services functions (except adoption and independent reviewing officer 
functions) to third party providers, including profit-making providers who have 
set up non-profit subsidiaries.7 Furthermore, there are indications that greater 
use of externalisations8 will be made in the future to deal with failing local 
authorities.9 The Children and Social Work Bill currently progressing through 
Parliament also makes provision for local authorities to be made exempt from 
requirements imposed by children’s social care legislation, for an initial period of 
three years, to test different ways of working that might achieve better 
outcomes, or the same outcomes more efficiently.10 The role that outsourcing 
could play in these interventions remains unclear. Britain’s vote to leave the 
European Union is likely to draw attention away from the domestic agenda and 
could delay the passing of legislation, including the Children and Social Work 
Bill, so these ambiguities do not look set to be resolved in the near future.  
There are benefits to pooling and rationalising services: wider reach, economies 
of scale, greater transparency and accountability, and the ability to respond 
rapidly to provider failure. Diversity brings choice, competition and innovation, 
and – particularly where smaller providers are involved – local knowledge and 
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connections, trust and relationship-based approaches. But while outsourcing to 
a wider range of providers can bring great rewards, any change in service 
delivery presents risks. The purpose of this report is to explore how we can 
maximise the benefits of outsourcing local authority children’s services, while 
protecting against those risks.  
Methodology 
Research for this project took place between February and June 2016. It 
comprised the following elements: 
 We reviewed literature relating to current (and potential future) policy and 
practice surrounding the delivery of children’s services in England and Wales, 
with a particular emphasis on innovations and responses to failure.  
 We undertook two combined case studies of previous experiences of 
outsourcing in children’s services: one domestic (the independent trust 
model, as implemented in Slough and Doncaster, and Achieving for Children 
in Kingston and Richmond) and one international (the liberalisation of 
children’s services in the US, specifically in Kansas, Florida and Washington).  
 We held 12 semi-structured interviews (face to face and by telephone) with 
professional experts drawn from the voluntary, independent and statutory 
sectors in England, Wales and the US. These included academics, local 
authority practitioners and members of representative bodies. We received 
written comments from a further two professional experts. 
 We collected evidence using a survey from members of the Children’s Service 
Development Group, a group of independent providers of care and specialist 
education services for children and young people with complex needs. 
 The project benefited from an expert advisory board (see list of names and 
positions in the acknowledgements), which met at the beginning of the 
project to discuss and give feedback on methodology, and provided written 
feedback on our interim findings and this final report. 
Background 
Writing in the Sunday Times this year, days ahead of the Queen’s Speech, 
former Prime Minister David Cameron announced that children in care have 
been ‘let down for too long’.11 The plight of children and young people who 
come into contact with children’s services is not an area of new political interest. 
Indeed, the issue has received attention from across the political spectrum over 
the years, resulting in various policy initiatives. 
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Despite this, children and young people with complex needs remain one of the 
most vulnerable groups in the country. In Ofsted’s inspections of children’s 
services departments from November 2013 to March 2016, 21 departments 
were judged inadequate and 43 were judged as requiring improvement. Only 23 
were deemed good or outstanding.12 Chief inspector Sir Michael Wilshaw 
described the results as ‘unacceptable’.13 
Poor children’s services have a profound impact on the children and young 
people who depend on them. Almost half of children in care have a diagnosable 
mental health disorder, compared with just one in ten children who are not in 
care.14 The Prison Reform Trust recently called on the government to prevent 
children in care from being prosecuted for challenging behaviour that would 
normally be managed within the family home.15 Furthermore, there is a much 
higher incidence of SEN among looked-after children than among the rest of 
the child population. In 2014, 66.6 per cent of looked-after children for whom 
data are available had SEN. Children with SEN lag behind their peers in 
educational attainment and associated outcomes. In 2013/14, pupils with SEN 
accounted for 7 in 10 of all permanent exclusions and 6 in 10 of all fixed period 
exclusions.16  
Rising demand 
Demand for children’s social care is rising. The number of looked-after children 
has increased steadily over the past seven years and it is now higher than at any 
point since 1985, with 69,540 looked-after children as of 31 March 2015.17 
Between 2008 and 2015, there was a 22 per cent rise in local authority referrals 
and a 16 per cent increase in the number of children in care.18  
Not only are the numbers of children and young people in care increasing, but 
their needs are also becoming more complex. Providers report seeing fewer 
children with behavioural, emotional and social difficulties but far greater 
numbers with a range of other needs, particularly those related to mental health 
disorders, and many come from dysfunctional families. Providers also report an 
increase in the number of children experiencing multiple placements breakdown 
which, understandably, makes it less likely that future placements will prove 
successful.  
Another strain on the resources of children’s services departments has been the 
implementation of the Children and Families Act 2014, which overhauled the 
SEND system. Under the act, statements of SEN and learning difficulty 
assessments (LDAs) are being phased out, and replaced with EHCPs. The 
legislation was welcomed by the children’s disability sector as it offers greater 
 10 
 
personalisation, and a strong focus on securing positive outcomes for children 
and young people with SEND. However, replacing statements and LDAs with 
EHCPs is a time-consuming and expensive process, and concerns have been 
raised by the children’s disability sector and local authorities that the process is 
putting local authorities under strain, and will not be completed by the deadline 
of March 2018. According to a report by The Key, a management support 
service for schools, three-quarters of schools have pupils who have been waiting 
longer than the expected time for an assessment of SEN or an EHCP.19 
Commenting on the report, Cllr Roy Perry (chairman of the Local Government 
Association’s Children and Young People Board) said,  
We were clear with the Department for Education at the time that 
implementing the SEND reforms in the Children and Families Bill was 
significantly underfunded by the government and this has been borne out 
in reality.20 
Financial pressures  
The pressures exerted by the increases in demand for children’s services have 
been compounded by the effects of financial austerity. Between 2009/10 and 
2014/15, spending by England’s local authorities was cut by 20 per cent. 
Children’s social care has been protected from the brunt of these cuts. 
Nevertheless, spending has still fallen: in 2011/12, £2.58 billion was spent by 
local authorities on children's social work and child protection services. This 
dropped by 18 per cent to £2.12 billion in 2014/15.21 Further planned cuts to 
local budgets make it likely that children’s services departments will come under 
increasing pressure to make savings.  
The impact of these cuts has been severe. Local authorities are reducing staff 
numbers in an effort to contain costs – for example, Newcastle Council made 
the news in January 2016 for its plans to shed 50 social work posts, including 
28.5 full-time posts in children’s services.22 Staff reductions impact on the size of 
caseloads for remaining staff, which are reaching dangerously high levels. In a 
survey of social workers (for both adult and children) conducted on 29 April 
2014, 39 per cent of respondents said that their caseload was over the formal 
limit on that day.23 Staff who worked in children’s services were more likely to be 
over the formal limit than those working with adults; 42 per cent of respondents 
left work with serious concerns about one or more of their cases. It should be no 
surprise that in its report into social work reform, the House of Commons 
Education Committee argued that unless endemic problems such as the poor 
working conditions faced by frontline social workers are addressed, the entire 
reform programme will be put at risk.24 Foster carers are feeling the impact of 
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cuts, too. According to a report by the Fostering Network, 67.8 per cent of 
respondents felt that cuts have reduced access to a fostered child’s social 
worker, and 53.7 per cent feel that cuts have affected the quantity and quality of 
foster care training.25 In the chapters that follow we examine how these and 
other cuts make outsourcing harder to implement successfully, which can result 
in poorer outcomes for children and families. 
Brexit and the change in political leadership 
Britain’s vote to leave the EU has created significant uncertainty regarding the 
future of the domestic policy agenda, including children’s social care. The next 
few years are likely to see significant time, energy and resources within 
government diverted to planning Britain’s exit, so many domestic policy 
agendas (such as children’s services) risk being deprioritised. More directly, a 
particular concern for those working in children’s services could be the long-
term impact on staffing. A significant number of Britain’s social care workforce 
are non-British EU workers. With the recruitment of care staff already a 
challenge for the sector, changes to immigration rules could potentially 
exacerbate the problem. 
The change in political leadership that accompanied the vote adds another level 
of uncertainty. It remains to be seen what May’s pledge to champion social 
justice and improve the lives of the most vulnerable26 amounts to in practice. At 
the time of going to print (September 2016), new Education Secretary Justine 
Greening has revealed few details of her plans for the department. However, 
there is an important element of continuity in the retention of Edward Timpson 
as Children’s Minister, who has indicated that the Children and Social Work Bill 
will be a key focus of his role, and form a major part of May’s life chances 
agenda.27 
Outsourcing of children’s services in the UK  
Outsourcing has a long history in many areas of the public sector in the UK, but 
there has been a great deal of public and political resistance to outsourcing of 
children’s services. This concern is somewhat understandable, given the highly 
sensitive nature of the service and the children it supports: children and young 
people with complex needs are a highly vulnerable group. Local authorities have 
important responsibilities as corporate parents, and failing to live up to these 
responsibilities could have disastrous consequences for the children in their 
care. Nevertheless, concerns about outsourcing are not always based on an 
objective view of the available evidence. The potential for outsourcing to help 
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the public sector manage rising demand and budgetary pressures, and deliver 
high quality outcomes for children and young people ought not be overlooked.  
The first attempts at outsourcing certain children’s services functions began 
around ten years ago. In 2006, the Labour government introduced the idea of 
‘independent social work practices’, autonomous organisations, which could be 
voluntary or privately owned, responsible for employing social workers. The idea 
was tested in a series of pilots from December 2009 to May 2010. Further 
exercises and initiatives were launched at the same time, many of which were 
supported by government programmes, such as the Commissioning Support 
Programme and the Children’s Social Care Innovation Programme. The latter 
was launched in 2013, with further funding announced in April 2016, and has 
funded a range of pilots, enabling local authorities and service providers to 
explore new, innovative ways of working. For many of these projects, 
outsourcing is critical. For example, it is funding Cambridgeshire County Council 
to migrate its successful Multi-Systemic Therapy team to a staff-owned, mutual 
model of delivery, with the aim of empowering and motivating staff. Torbay 
Council has also received funding to bring together children and adult’s health 
and social care functions in early help teams, delivered by an independent 
provider, and to establish a public service trust to allow pooling of budgets and 
joint commissioning. Not unexpectedly, given the complexity of commissioning 
children’s services, these early efforts have had varying degrees of success. 
The move towards outsourcing has not been a straightforwardly linear process. 
Local authorities have responded in different ways. On the one hand, under 
financial pressure following the economic downturn in 2008, some local 
authorities reduced or resisted outsourcing, perceiving independent and 
voluntary provider services to have higher costs than in-house services. On the 
other hand, many local authorities reacted in the opposite way, seeing budget 
cuts as a reason to outsource more, not less.  
The motivation has not just been to control costs. Outsourcing has also been 
used as a means of responding to failure. Following successive ‘inadequate’ and 
‘requires improvement’ ratings from Ofsted, and seven serious case reviews, an 
independent review recommended in 2013 that Doncaster children’s services be 
removed from local authority control, and made an independent trust, with the 
council commissioning services from the trust for at least five years.28 Also as a 
result of sustained failure, Slough moved to the trust model in 2015, and 
Sunderland and Birmingham are to follow. At the end of last year, David 
Cameron pledged that children’s services departments judged inadequate by 
Ofsted will be taken over by high-performing councils and charities if they 
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cannot demonstrate improvement within six months.29 Furthermore, a clear 
commitment to ‘alternative models of delivery’ (including trusts and combined 
authorities) was made in Putting Children First, which states the government’s 
ambition that by 2020 over a third of current local authorities will either be 
delivering children’s services through a new model, or actively working towards 
one.30 Therefore we can only expect further services to be taken out of local 
authority control, inevitably altering commissioner–provider relationships in the 
process. 
Today, independent and voluntary providers play a significant role in the 
delivery of children’s services. Of all children and young people in foster 
placements as at 31 March 2015, 67 per cent were placed by local authority 
fostering agencies. The rest were placed by independent fostering agencies, the 
majority of which are privately owned rather than voluntary.31 Of the children’s 
homes on Ofsted’s register on 31 March 2014, 21 per cent were run by the local 
authority, 6 per cent by voluntary providers and 73 per cent by independent 
providers.32 With ten years of experience to draw from, and the mixed economy 
becoming ever more prominent in children’s services, now is the time to reflect 
on what has worked and what has not.  
Outsourcing is an art, not a science. Commissioners must be sensitive to local 
circumstances and local needs, and for that reason there can be no bullet-proof 
plan to guide them. But that does not mean we cannot derive general principles 
to follow, on the basis of experience within England and Wales – and further 
afield too. Outsourcing children’s services has a longer history in other parts of 
the world than it does here, most notably the US. In the following chapters we 
outline key lessons from past experiences of outsourcing in this area, identifying 
ways of maximising its benefits and potential pitfalls to avoid. 
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2 WHAT WORKS?  
In this chapter we consider some of the factors that outsourced children’s 
services that are working well have in common. We can draw these together 
under three broad themes: having strong relationships, using data effectively 
and having clarity on outcomes. 
Having strong relationships 
Relationships are at the heart of high quality commissioning – particularly in an 
area as complex as children’s services. Research into outsourcing has tended to 
focus on the relationships between commissioners and providers. But the 
success of outsourcing depends on the nature of a much wider range of 
relationships, including relationships within the commissioning organisations, 
relationships between commissioning organisations, and relationships between 
the commissioning organisation, providers and the wider community. Below, we 
explore what each of these sets of relationships tend to look like when 
outsourcing is a success. 
Relationships within the local authority or trust 
Relationships within the commissioning organisation itself are important 
because they shape how commissioners respond to providers. Currently, the 
commissioning organisation is usually a local authority (or local authorities), 
although in some areas an independent trust has taken on that role. 
Evidence suggests that within local authorities (or trusts) that outsource 
successfully there tend to be strong relationships between the internal 
commissioning and operational functions. Whether there is a close relationship 
between these functions depends partly on the size of the organisation. In small 
or medium-sized local authorities the commissioner often has a wide remit that 
encompasses operational work as well as commissioning. This is beneficial as it 
gives the commissioner first-hand insight into the market, as well as influence 
over the placements service. But in larger local authorities, roles and 
responsibilities tend to be compartmentalised to a greater degree, leading to 
weaker relationships between the commissioning and operational functions. 
This is particularly problematic in commissioning for children and young people 
with SEND. As one of our independent provider interviewees said: ‘Good 
commissioning from our perspective is where the commissioner is intimately 
linked with the special educational needs department.’ 
Without strong relationships between commissioning and SEND teams, SEND 
teams are unaware of the kinds of placements offered by providers. 
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Commissioners lack knowledge of the needs of children and young people, 
making them less able to articulate those needs to providers. 
One way of strengthening the link between the operational and commissioning 
functions of local authorities (or trusts) would be to widen the remits of 
commissioners. For commissioners of SEND, this wider remit might include 
having a voice in the EHCP assessment process.  
The impact of trusts on internal relationships 
The move towards creating trusts raises further questions about internal 
relationships. It is important to note that there is no single trust model – the 
roles and responsibilities of each party vary from trust to trust. However, in 
Slough, for example, it has been agreed that the trust will be responsible for 
both strategic and operational commissioning. There are two benefits of 
transferring more services, rather than less, from local authority control: first, the 
trust has more autonomy, which enhances the feeling of there being a ‘fresh 
start’ and an opportunity to do things differently. Furthermore, removing the 
vast majority of the function ensures that commissioners and operations staff 
remain part of the same organisation. This helps develop strong relationships 
between the two functions, which has been shown above to increase the chance 
of outsourcing being a success.  
However, the risk of creating a sharp divide between children’s services and the 
rest of the local authority is that it makes partnership working between different 
service areas more difficult. Children’s services are more successful when they 
are well integrated with other departments, such as adult social care and mental 
health services, to ensure that children and young people have the wider 
support they need to succeed, and they are well prepared for the future. This is 
more difficult when the departments are situated in different organisations. A 
similar point can be made about SEN, which remains the responsibility of the 
local authority when a trust is created. Independent providers may have a role in 
mitigating this risk. Independent providers deliver a range of services, including 
services for children with SEN, those for looked-after children, and services for 
children who are looked after and have SEN. In the course of delivering these 
services they would be brought into contact with both the trust and the local 
authority. This would help to bridge the gap.  
Commissioner–provider relationships 
Much of the evidence emphasises the importance of commissioner–provider 
relationships to the outsourcing process. Many of the providers we spoke to 
were keen to stress that they had good relationships with some local authorities. 
Nevertheless, a significant proportion identified commissioner–provider 
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relationships as being significant impediments to service delivery. The two key 
features we identified of constructive commissioner–provider relationships were 
collaborative working and having positive attitudes to outsourcing. 
Collaboration 
Collaborative working has two key components: good communication and trust 
between commissioners and providers. First, there needs to be frequent 
communication between commissioners and providers for the purpose of 
sharing information as information flow is vital in both directions. For example, 
commissioners should articulate the needs of their population to providers so 
that providers can plan the right services, while providers need to share with the 
local authority what services they will be able to provide. These particular 
information flows are crucial for the local authority's strategic planning. An 
independent provider who responded to our survey drew attention to this, 
saying that one of the top three things that would make delivering quality 
services easier would be, ‘Being involved in the planning of services with local 
authorities so the right services are offered in the right places.’ 
Second, collaborative working requires there to be trust between commissioners 
and providers. Trust enables providers to follow commissioner leads about 
future strategic direction and budgets, allowing them to respond appropriately 
in their own internal planning procedures. It is also important for commissioners 
to trust the professional abilities of providers, and their motivation to do what is 
best for the children and young people in their care, in order for outcomes-
based commissioning to take place. Outcomes-based commissioning fosters 
innovation by allowing providers to engage in activities that they think will 
improve outcomes for children, rather than activities dictated by the local 
authority. Without commissioners trusting providers, it is unlikely that they 
would commit to outcomes-based commissioning, which necessitates the use of 
micro-management and targets, which do not achieve the best outcomes. We 
discuss this further below.  
Evidence from the US shows that collaboration should ideally start before the 
outsourcing process begins (or before the use of outsourcing is expanded). This 
is important so that the public and independent sectors can work together to 
plan how they will ensure that there is sufficiency (as discussed in the next 
section) and that providers will have the relevant expertise and capacity to 
deliver high quality services. Strategic planning is complex, and without strong 
relationships it does not yield results: as the case of Washington demonstrates 
(box 1). 
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There was a perception among independent providers we spoke to that 
changes in commissioning practices in recent years had made commissioner–
provider relationships less collaborative. In particular, the use of framework 
agreements had reduced these relationships to the sum of sporadic, one-way 
interactions whereby the commissioner contacted all providers on the 
framework with potential referrals. One provider said that often there was no 
named contact given, so that the details of the referral could not be properly 
discussed. When there is one-way interaction providers cannot work with 
commissioners on strategic planning. One provider said that the change they 
most wanted to see was for local authorities to show a ‘willingness to talk about 
their needs and about how potentially an independent provider could work with 
that’. This would be more helpful than simply holding annual provider events, 
which were described as ‘tokenistic’. Several respondents to our survey cited 
greater engagement with the market as being one of the top three pieces of 
Box 1 Children’s services in Washington 
Following the lead of Kansas, Florida and others, Washington's legislature passed a 
bill in 2009, which intended to reform the child welfare system bill through a two-
stage process. The first phase required the Children’s Administration of the 
Department of Social and Health Services to convert existing contracts with 
independent providers to performance-based contracts, and to reduce the number 
of providers. The second phase was to set up pilots, which would be used to compare 
case management by state and independent providers. The legislation also 
established the Child Welfare Transformation Design Committee, a board of 
community representatives, to oversee and guide the transition. The move to the new 
system has been hit by a series of delays – the Committee being suspended by an 
injunction, a lack of bidders for network administrator (lead agency) contracts, and 
opposition by the Washington State Federation of Employees. As a result of these 
delays piloting (phase 2) has not yet begun, and is years behind schedule. 
Nevertheless, much can be learned from the way Washington has gone about 
preparing for liberalisation. 
Learning from the experience of states including Kansas and Florida, where initial 
mistakes were made because these states were some of the first to attempt 
liberalisation of children’s services, Washington planned the process very carefully. 
Nevertheless, five out of eight potential bidders for ‘network administrator’ (lead 
agency) contracts indicated that they would not submit proposals, suggesting the 
state had not properly understood the positions of providers. 
 18 
 
advice they would give to local authorities looking to improve their 
commissioning.  
Attitudes to outsourcing 
Local authority resistance to outsourcing, for ideological or other reasons, is 
often another feature of poor commissioner–provider relationships. Evidence 
suggests this issue is a polarising one, and some commissioners are comfortable 
with a mixed economy and want to work with providers (of all types). Others 
feel strongly that children’s services should be ‘protected’ from profit-making 
organisations regardless of any evidence regarding outcomes or efficiency. 
Several of our interviewees also said that they thought that many 
commissioners wanted to work with independent providers, but lacked the 
freedom to do so because of the bureaucratic nature of local government. One 
independent provider commented, ‘There are commissioners where you can 
sense that they really want to do something but they feel a bit strangled by the 
regulations.’ 
Great emphasis was put on the fact that local authority decisions are often 
influenced by their internal cultures, and that these cultures are determined by 
senior management. Given the hierarchical nature of decision making in local 
authorities, it is critical that senior managers demonstrate positive attitudes 
towards outsourcing, giving commissioners further down the organisation the 
freedom to engage with providers. One independent provider told us: 
Some local authorities have quite innovative management, who recognise 
the need for a mixed economy, and the messaging goes down through 
them to their troops. 
Another agreed: 
I also think that then creates a bit of a culture, where commissioners know 
what the rules are, they know what they can and can’t do, and so what they 
do is behave in a way that fits the norms of that culture. 
Evidence suggests that cultural resistance to outsourcing also results in 
independent providers being held to higher standards than in-house services, 
which causes further breakdowns in relationships, as one of the sector experts 
noted: 
Frankly, they [independent providers] are held to a higher standard than 
public sector providers… If one of them fails this is regarded as a criticism 
of the whole system of outsourcing, whereas if a public sector provider fails 
that isn’t regarded – well, not always regarded anyway – as a criticism of 
the whole public sector 
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Externalisation may be one solution to cultural resistance to outsourcing. In 
particular, newly created independent trusts may have an advantage when 
promoting positive attitudes to independent providers. First, the sense of doing 
something new provides a break from the past, allowing – if not encouraging – 
staff to get away from ‘business as usual’. As one representative from a trust 
told us, ‘You mustn’t underestimate the value of a fresh start.’ Second, 
externalisation may remove a barrier for commissioners who want to engage 
with independent providers but who were previously prevented from doing so 
by senior management within the local authority.  
Relationships between the local authority (or trust), providers and the 
wider community 
Children’s services departments rely on the support of a wide range of 
stakeholders when delivering services, such as carers, charities, and health and 
education professionals. Without their support it is incredibly difficult for 
children’s services to secure positive outcomes for children and young people. 
Therefore outsourcing too should be focused on improving services for the local 
community, and the local community must be part of the process from the 
outset. Engaging stakeholders is particularly important where there may be 
public resistance to outsourcing. As outlined in the introduction, children’s 
services is a particularly sensitive and emotive subject area, as looked-after 
children and children with complex needs are known to be vulnerable. This has 
prompted some public opposition to outsourcing in children’s services, 
particularly where this includes for-profit providers. For example, proposed 
powers to test different ways of working, which form part of the Children and 
Social Work Bill currently passing through Parliament, have provoked opposition 
from a range of third sector organisations and academics as well as the Labour 
Party.33 In order to reassure the wider community that outsourcing can be a 
positive step, it is important to ensure that the process is transparent and 
legitimate, with participation from and oversight by the local community. 
Engaging with children with SEND and their families 
It is particularly important that commissioners and providers foster relationships 
with children and young people with SEND, and their families. The 2014 SEND 
reforms were partly a response to ongoing complaints that the previous system 
was adversarial, complex for parents and carers to navigate, and failed to take 
into account the voice of the child and their family. The shortcomings of the 
system were recognised by politicians across the political spectrum – hence the 
high degree of political unity there was on the need for the reforms. As a 
provider told us, the reforms are an opportunity to ‘get it [commissioning] right 
for this group’. If the system is to be truly person-centric, and work with rather 
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than against families, it is important that commissioners of services for children 
with SEND commit to building bridges with the community, including families, 
children and young people. 
Ways of building relationships with the community 
The importance of there being positive relationships between commissioners, 
providers and the wider community is also clear from the experiences of the US. 
Kansas liberalised its child welfare system very rapidly, failing to engage with the 
local community beforehand. During the process, many community 
representatives voiced their concerns that independent providers would not be 
able to deliver adequate services. This made it very difficult for providers to 
foster positive working relationships once the contracts began, as there was no 
initial basis of support or engagement to work from. 
 
Learning from the mistakes made in Kansas, Washington gave community 
stakeholders a key role in the liberalisation process by forming the 
Transformation Design Committee. The Committee was made up of foster 
carers, representatives from the state’s health and legal systems, children’s 
charities and more. It was not simply consulted about the transition to the new 
system, but was made responsible for overseeing and driving the transition. By 
giving community stakeholders this role, Washington fostered trust with those 
who might have been concerned about liberalisation and resistant to the 
change.  
Box 2 Children’s services in Kansas 
Kansas was the first state to undergo a wide-scale reform of its child welfare system. 
In the early 1990s the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) was in 
crisis. The number of child abuse and neglect reports investigated by the SRS had 
increased by approximately 34 per cent between 1980 and 1990. In 1990, 20 per cent 
of investigations were not reviewed timely and adequately, putting children and 
young people at serious risk. Department procedures were not being followed and 
staff felt they did not have the resources to do their job. In 1996 the state began a 
liberalisation process whereby all family preservation, foster care and adoption 
services were contracted out to the independent sector, in an effort to improve 
outcomes and drive down costs. Being the first state to liberalise in this way, 
mistakes were made and lessons learned, and after several years of correcting these 
mistakes and honing their model, the child welfare system in Kansas now ranks 
among the best of all US states. In the Federal Children and Family Services Review 
(2010) Kansas was judged first for preserving family connections and in enhancing 
families’ capacity to meet their needs. 
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Another key form of community engagement is to call on stakeholders to help 
define what positive outcomes are for looked-after children and children with 
SEND. Some of the experts we consulted stress the point that there is no ‘gold 
standard’ of provision for children’s services. There is no consensus on what 
outcomes for children and young people these services should strive towards. 
Because outcomes are contentious, they should be defined by the individual 
community. Washington recognised this point and acted accordingly, giving the 
Transformation Committee a key role in defining the outcomes which would be 
used by commissioners and providers to attempt to accomplish. We discuss 
outcomes in greater detail later in this report. 
Relationships between local authorities 
There is an important trend in commissioning of children’s services towards the 
creation of consortia. A commissioning consortium is a group of local 
authorities who join together to commission, for example by use of a common 
framework agreement. An example of this is the North West Fostering 
Framework, created in 2010, which was joined by all local authorities in the 
North West region except Cumbria. Sir Martin Narey expressed his support for 
large commissioning consortia in his review of residential care, and this support 
was echoed by the government in Putting Children First.34 
It is beyond the scope of this research to examine the advantages and 
disadvantages of consortia commissioning in depth. In summary, consortia offer 
a number of benefits. For example, they allow member local authorities to 
benefit from economies of scale, as providers are able to offer lower costs in 
return for greater numbers of referrals. For this reason, Sir Martin recommends, 
‘The Department for Education must require local authorities to come together 
into large consortia for the purpose of obtaining significant discounts from 
private and voluntary sector providers.’35 Consortia also offer benefits to 
providers, who are able to do business with a large number of local authorities 
without acquainting themselves with an equivalent number of procurement 
procedures, which can vary greatly from local authority to local authority. 
However, joining a consortium presents risks to a local authority, for example if 
it holds less power than other local authorities. This may be the case if the local 
authority in question is a small, unitary authority. Successful commissioning 
hinges on delivering the right services for the specific population. If a small local 
authority joins a vast fostering framework, it risks losing its voice, which may 
result in the fostering framework failing to deliver the placements required to 
meet the needs of its specific population. This is more likely to happen where 
the consortium consists of local authorities which are highly diverse in their 
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populations and cultures, or in the challenges they face. The risks that consortia 
commissioning presents to individual local authorities should be kept in mind as 
more local authorities start to consider this option. Therefore we are sceptical of 
Sir Martin’s call for local authorities to be required to come together into 
consortia. 
 
Box 3 Children’s services in Kingston Council and Richmond Council 
In April 2014 Kingston Council and Richmond Council launched Achieving for Children, a 
community interest company that provides their children’s services. Achieving for 
Children aims to increase partnership working to provide a whole-person approach at a 
reduced cost, to increase the capacity and resilience of public services, and to provide a 
centre of excellence and innovation that will be available to other authorities and public 
service providers.  
Independence from its two parent councils has enabled Achieving for Children to create 
its own culture, behave differently and be less hierarchical. The company has also given 
the frontline more power – for example, a pilot was launched giving frontline staff small 
budgets to spend on children and families as they saw fit. In 2015, following the launch 
of the company, Kingston’s children’s services were rated as good – an improvement on 
being rated inadequate by the council in 2012.  
Achieving for Children is now considering five expansion models: 
 setting up a franchise scheme, to sell the model to other local authorities 
 adding another council as a co-owner 
 taking on contracts to run services in other areas 
 selling consultancy to other areas 
 setting up an Achieving for Children subsidiary company with another council 
Despite its successes, the case of Achieving for Children shows that externalisation 
cannot be expected to yield immediate cost savings. Set up costs were significant, at 
£1.4 million, and by the end of 2018/19 there is a forecasted deficit of £8.2 million.36 
 
Using data effectively 
The importance of collecting and effectively using accurate data as part of the 
commissioning process is a consistent message across our research. 
Furthermore, in its paper Putting Children First, the Department for Education 
(DfE) has committed to move from ‘a system of data collection to data-driven 
practice, and improve the quality and collection of data’.37 Evidence suggests 
three sets of data are needed in order for the benefits of outsourcing to be 
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maximised: data about the population, data about costs, and data about 
outcomes. We discuss each of these in turn. 
Population data 
The sufficiency duty 
Section 22G of the Children Act 1989 conferred a duty of sufficiency on local 
authorities. According to this duty, local authorities must take steps to ensure 
that, as far as is reasonably practicable, there are sufficient placements available 
locally to accommodate all looked-after children for which the local authority is 
responsible. Policy regarding sufficiency has since been strengthened, first by 
the introduction of Sufficiency Statutory Guidance in April 2010, which requires 
local authorities to include their plans for meeting the sufficiency duty in their 
commissioning strategies. Second, by requiring that from April 2011, local 
authorities must be in a position to secure, where reasonably practicable, 
sufficient accommodation for looked-after children within their area. 
In order for a local authority to undertake effective strategic commissioning, and 
thereby fulfil the sufficiency duty, it needs to predict what services will be 
required in the future. More specifically, it needs to be able to predict the 
characteristics of the population potentially using the services (the case mix), the 
rate of referral and size of the population, the duration of each case, and the 
level of services required for each case. The only way of making accurate 
predictions is through obtaining and using accurate population data.  
Lack of population data currently used 
One of our survey respondents said that the quality of commissioning has not 
moved on since 2010 because there is still ‘a lack of focus on sufficiency’. Our 
research uncovered a strong consensus that simply not enough population data 
are collected, which explains the lack of focus on sufficiency. Summarising a 
widely held view, one respondent to our survey said, 
Much more time should be spent understanding need and demand. All too 
often this is ignored or simplified because of the level of difficulty involved 
in analysing human trends and need patterns. Without it, however, 
commissioning is misguided at best.  
One of our interviewees described his perception that some local authorities 
simply parroted widely held beliefs about what future populations will look like 
(eg children will have more complex needs), rather than analysing what would 
be true for their specific population. 
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Barriers to using population data effectively 
There are clear reasons why local authorities might be discouraged from making 
full use of data. They are challenging and time-consuming to analyse – not to 
mention costly to collect. Moreover, there are additional factors currently at play 
that are further discouraging the use of data in strategic commissioning. First, 
local authorities may feel that even with an accurate picture of the future needs 
of their population, they are in a weaker position to act on their understanding 
to ensure sufficiency. For example, small unitary local authorities might feel that 
they will lose their voice in the move towards regionalisation (as described 
above).  
Second, and more significantly, is the impact of the 2014 SEND reforms. These 
are making it more difficult for commissioners to grasp what the children and 
young people in their area need, for a variety of reasons. The needs of a child 
with SEND are now understood as being relative to the outcomes the child (and 
their family) wants to achieve. This is a very positive move, as it makes the 
system more person-centric, but it also means that identifying what services a 
child needs becomes a less standardised process, increasing the workload of 
commissioners. Furthermore, not all local authorities are currently assessing 
children in the correct way – some are issuing more EHCPs than others, even 
though the level of SEND is comparable. As these issues are ironed out, there 
will be greater unpredictability for commissioners to contend with. 
Costs data 
As well as data about populations, data about costs are needed for successful 
outsourcing. Without knowing the average cost of a service (in this case, a 
child’s care journey), commissioners risk over or underpaying providers, as they 
do not know how much contracts are worth, nor can they determine value for 
money when assessing contracts.  
International evidence on the importance of costs data 
Kansas offers a clear illustration of what the consequences of lacking costs data 
can be. Given the absence of the data, providers in Kansas were forced to base 
their bids for contracts on speculation, and significantly underestimated their 
costs. Furthermore, no start-up costs were built into the contracts they signed. 
After the first year of outsourcing, there was a 20 per cent increase in the 
number of cases entering the child welfare system, as a result of the child 
protection function (which remained wholly in-house) having more time to 
investigate cases. This combination of unanticipated start-up costs, lack of data 
on service costs, and an increase in the number of children entering the system 
all contributed to significant financial challenges for providers, resulting in 
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widespread loss and one bankruptcy. Provider failure not only impacts on 
shareholders – it also disrupts a local authority’s strategic commissioning, 
making it more difficult to ensure sufficiency, particularly when the provider is 
large, as many independent providers are in England and Wales. 
Methods of calculating costs 
Establishing costs data is a difficult task. The more complex the case, the more 
difficult it is to calculate the cost of care. However, it must become a priority if 
local authorities are to manage the market effectively. Learning from what 
happened in Kansas, Washington made it a key responsibility of its 
Transformation Committee to identify a model for minimising financial risk to 
service providers and to establish a description of the costs involved for the 
transition and start-up periods.38 Similar work on data costs is being done by 
some local authorities in England and Wales, but not consistently by all local 
authorities. 
There are a number of tools that can be used to establish data on costs. For 
example, researchers based at the Centre for Child and Family Research at 
Loughborough University have created a software tool, the Cost Calculator for 
Children’s Services (CCfCS; www.ccfcs.org.uk/), which can be used to calculate 
the costs of different care journeys based on local historical data. The calculator 
uses a ‘bottom-up’ approach to estimating unit costs, first explicated by 
Beecham in 2000.39 As the researchers explain, the bottom-up approach is 
‘particularly well suited to children’s social care services as it can accommodate 
variations in costs incurred by an extensive range of interventions offered to 
children with very different levels of need’.40 
Common mistakes when calculating costs  
The single biggest mistake made by those estimating children’s services costs is 
interpreting ‘costs’ too narrowly – a point raised implicitly in written feedback 
we received from a sector expert: 
No local authority has done a full cost benefit analysis of how much in-
house fostering costs (including quality of support against caseload, 
placement breakdowns due to this, staff turnover due to caseloads, etc). 
The CCfCS makes a distinction between service costs (the cost of a placement) 
and case management costs (functions carried out by social workers, family 
support workers and other social care personnel). Both sets of costs need to be 
taken into account when calculating the total cost of a service. This may seem 
obvious, but many estimates fail to account for case management costs fully. 
Take two placements: one is more expensive but of higher quality. The other is 
less expensive but of lower quality. Because the more expensive placement is of 
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higher quality, less case management is required – in real terms, less 
intervention by the social worker is needed, freeing up their time. On the other 
hand, the less expensive placement requires greater intervention by social 
workers. If the placement was very poor, it might result in a breakdown, 
requiring a vast amount of a social worker’s time – and other people’s time in 
order to find a new placement. A service may appear to be more or less 
expensive than it actually is, if case management costs are not properly 
considered. 
Another set of costs that are often neglected when costing a service are back-
office functions (such as the human resources and finance functions of the 
organisation providing the service). One interviewee told us that when costing 
their service independent providers include the cost of back-office functions, 
whereas local authorities do not do the same. If this perception is correct, then 
the costs of in-house services and independent services are being compared 
inaccurately. The same point is made by Sir Martin Narey, who reports that there 
may be reason to be concerned about the profits taken by private foster care 
providers, but that the local authority underestimating its overheads may 
partially explain the difference in price.41 
The impact of incomplete cost calculations 
Lack of clarity around costs damages relationships between commissioners and 
providers, as they may not fully understand each other’s actions nor feel they 
can trust the other side.  
A more worrying issue was raised by several of our interviewees, who expressed 
concerns that incomplete calculations of costs were driving local authority 
behaviour that was damaging to the lives of children and young people. An 
independent provider told us: 
What has got worse in my view is this business now of wanting to move 
children that are pretty settled back in-house as soon as they can, for what 
appears to be financial reasons. 
Moving a child who is settled and doing well in a placement would be 
questionable even if it was known that the costs of the new placement would be 
lower. But the fact that actions like these are taken without a full understanding 
of the longer-term costs is deeply worrying. It may be the case that in-house 
services in a particular area are cheaper, but it may not, and local authorities 
need to have the data in order to make an informed decision. We discuss the 
issue of price-driven behaviour further in chapter 3. 
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Demos’ own research demonstrates that placement stability reduces costs and 
promotes good outcomes for children. There is also evidence to suggest that 
using the independent sector can help ensure placement stability.  
First, using independent providers enables children to be matched to more 
appropriate placements. According to Schofield et al, ‘the number of possible 
placements to choose between did seem to increase when it was possible to 
approach the IFP [independent and voluntary sector fostering provider] sector’, 
compared with cases in which local authorities refrained from using 
independent providers.42 Having access to a wide range of placements increases 
the likelihood that children will be given placements suited to their needs, thus 
minimising the chances of placement breakdown. This is particularly likely to 
benefit children and young people with more complex needs, who require 
placements that can offer more specialist support. 
Second, evidence suggests that foster carers working with independent 
providers are better supported than those working with local authorities. This is 
certainly a perception among parents: according to a blog written by a foster 
carer and hosted by the Fostering Network: 
The level of support – especially practical – is often higher with an agency 
than an LA [local authority]. They have a better ratio of supervising social 
workers to foster carers so one is usually available to step in, if necessary, in 
an emergency and offer hands-on support, for example, by collecting a 
child from school.43 
Where foster carers are better supported, placement breakdown is less likely. 
Outcomes data 
Finally, collecting and collating data about the outcomes achieved by children 
and young people in order to measure and monitor performance is crucial. As is 
the case with data about populations and costs, data about outcomes are 
expensive to collect and time-consuming to analyse. However, outcomes data 
have become increasingly significant with the growth of interest in outcomes-
based commissioning across many public sector areas. Outcomes-based 
commissioning is a subset of payment by results. It involved payments based on 
social outcomes achieved, rather than broader output measures.44 As payments 
to providers are determined by how far outcomes have been achieved, it is 
crucial that accurate data about outcomes are collected, if outcomes-based 
commissioning is to be a success. We discuss outcomes further in the next 
section. 
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Box 4 In loco parentis 
In the study In Loco Parentis Demos researchers used an analogy to make the point that 
lower expenditure on a looked-after child’s care journey does not necessarily generate 
cost savings. The report draws on two hypothetical examples of the journey of children 
who have had either a very fortunate, stable experience with their placements (child A) 
or an unstable, disrupted experience with their placements (child B). The study did not 
seek to prove that one particular type of care journey comes with inevitable 
consequences on a young person’s future as it does not take into account a young 
person’s personal characteristics, which significantly define the impact of their care 
journey.  
The study aimed to display the differences in costs associated with two hypothetical and 
realistic examples of extremely different care journeys. The study found a significant 
variation in immediate costs between the two examples: overall state expenditure on 
child A (the stable journey) was £352,053 over a 15-year period, compared with 
£393,579 spent on child B (the unstable journey) over a 7-year period. Therefore, the 
difference in annual costs per year is even greater: £23,470.20 per year for child A and 
£56,335.57 for child B – a short-term cost difference of £32,755.37 per year more for 
child B’s journey than for child A’s.  
The report then considered the long-term consequences of the children’s respective 
care journeys and illustrates the cyclical escalation of unstable care experiences and 
costs, as child B experiences an inverse relationship between costs and outcome. The 
cost data used in the report were able to capture very clearly both the short and longer-
term cost implications of different types of care planning – something so critical for local 
authorities as they plan their services.45 
 
Having clarity on outcomes  
How and why outcomes need to be defined 
As described earlier in this chapter, there is no agreement on what outcomes 
children’s services should aim towards. But an independent provider we spoke 
to said what was really needed was ‘real clarity from the commissioner about 
what it is they’re trying to commission’. In its paper Putting Children First, the 
DfE recently announced a new What Works Centre, with the remit of ‘bringing 
together in one place our national understanding of practical excellence’ in 
children’s social care.46 But without clarity on what good outcomes are, 
children’s services will inevitably lack an overarching vision towards which 
commissioners and providers can unify and work towards – to the inevitable 
detriment of children, young people and their families. This vision is needed 
whether or not a local authority chooses to outsource.  
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Defining outcomes for looked-after children is difficult. Managers of the child 
welfare system in Kansas used ‘permanency’ as their key indicator – a good 
outcome being for a child to stay in the same foster care placement for a long 
period of time. Other outcomes that are often used internationally and 
domestically include safety (absence of repeat abuse), reunification, wellbeing 
and educational attainment. Box 5 lists some possible definitions of outcomes 
for looked-after children. 
Efforts to clarify outcomes should draw on existing work and research. 
Nevertheless, it is important for each community to develop its own 
understanding of what positive outcomes are for children and young people in 
their local area, according to the needs of the local population and challenges 
faced locally. Therefore defining outcomes needs to be a community-led 
exercise, allowing local groups to contribute to the process. 
 
Box 5 Possible definitions of outcomes for looked-after children 
Directors of children’s services  
In a position statement the Association of Directors of Children’s Services sets out the 
purpose of the care system as being to protect children from further harm, to improve 
outcomes for vulnerable children and young people by addressing their individual 
needs, and to address a child’s needs for good parenting.47 
The United Nations  
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) states that children 
might be considered to have achieved positive outcomes when they enjoy the rights 
accorded to them under the UNCRC. Certain articles are particularly relevant, eg Article 
20 (children deprived of a family), ‘If a child cannot be looked after by their family, 
governments must make sure that they are looked after properly by people who respect 
the child’s religion, culture and language.’48 
Work on children’s wellbeing  
Work on definitions of children’s wellbeing drawn from children is being led jointly by 
the Children’s Society and the University of York. Research focuses on subjective 
wellbeing, based on two elements: life satisfaction and experience of positive or 
negative emotions at a specific point in time.49 
Children and young people in care  
The definition of outcomes might draw on what children in care themselves consider to 
be important to their wellbeing. The School for Policy Studies at the University of Bristol 
conducted 18 focus groups to develop an online survey measuring the subjective 
wellbeing of children in care. Unlike children in the general population, looked-after 
 30 
 
children thought that having a coherent account of their histories and knowing the 
reason for being in care was crucial.50 
Particularly close consideration must be given to defining outcomes for children 
with SEND, given the diversity of this group and the new focus on adopting a 
person-centred approach. EHCPs specify tailored outcomes for children and 
young people, thus the very principle of identifying a small number of generic 
outcomes appears to be in conflict with the spirit of the SEND reforms. 
Nevertheless, a list of broad outcomes for children with SEND is needed, while 
recognising that an individual’s outcomes may deviate slightly from the broad 
list. Without it, children’s services will lack a clear strategic vision for children 
with SEND. 
Using outcomes to improve services  
Once a local authority has defined what a positive outcome would be for 
children and young people in their area, there remains a question of how 
outcomes will be integrated into the children’s services system. There are more 
and less ambitious ways of using outcomes to improve services.  
Measuring and monitoring outcomes 
As a starting position, outcomes (once locally defined) should be measured and 
monitored. Data on outcomes enable the local authority to understand how well 
existing services are delivering for children, young people and their families. The 
local authority can identify where existing provision is falling short, and share 
this information with in-house and independent providers, which can then plan 
improvements to their services.  
Outcomes-based commissioning 
Measuring and monitoring outcomes presents no risk to commissioners, apart 
from the cost involved in collecting and analysing data. A more ambitious way 
of using outcomes is to adopt outcomes-based commissioning (as previously 
mentioned). Rather than contracting providers to deliver certain outputs, 
providers are contracted to deliver positive outcomes for the children and 
young people in their care. Outcomes-based commissioning involves a shift in 
control from the local authority to providers, as providers are free to undertake 
whichever activities they think will promote positive outcomes – not activities 
which are predetermined by the local authority. This shift is often beneficial as it 
fosters innovation among providers, who find new ways of delivering high 
quality services. Speaking about a project that used outcomes-based 
commissioning, one of our independent provider interviewees said: 
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They set the problem, and said, ‘it’s up to you to solve it, so we haven’t got 
a fixed idea of what the solution looks like in our head, what we do want is 
an evidence-based programme that solves the problem’… I thought that 
was a creative way of doing a piece of contracted work. 
However, there are two potential risks involved in outcomes-based 
commissioning. First, it risks being ineffective if the outcomes set (which may be 
entirely valid at the local level) are not outcomes which providers have control 
over. As one of the sector experts we consulted said: 
The ability of the organisation concerned to affect the outcome may be 
limited, particularly in the children’s services area where one might, say, 
look at, specify, outcomes in terms of educational performance of looked-
after children, but that’s subject to so many different factors, not least the 
school itself, that it’s hard to hold, say, a fostering organisation or whatever 
to account for that, because it has so little influence over it. 
Furthermore, there is a risk that providers lack accountability for their actions as 
they are paid not for the outcomes that they achieve, but for the cost of the 
activities they undertake in pursuit of those outcomes. This problem can be 
solved by aligning payments with outcomes, as we discuss below. 
Aligning payments to providers with outcomes 
The most ambitious outcomes-led approach is not only commissioning 
according to outcomes, but paying providers according to how far they achieve 
those outcomes. Paying providers according to outcomes improves the 
accountability of providers to the local authority, as they are only rewarded if 
their activities produce real results.  
A strong case in favour of outcomes-based commissioning over alternative 
payment mechanisms can be made on the basis of evidence from Kansas, which 
has adopted several different payment methods since it began outsourcing its 
services for looked-after children in 1997. First, it used a case rate based on an 
historical average length stay. But it was found to be too risky for providers, 
many of which suffered significant losses as children stayed in care a lot longer 
than expected. In 2000, Kansas moved to an annual case rate paid per child per 
month to remove the risk of losses through lengthy stays, though was still liable 
for losses if children needed costlier services than expected or if they re-entered 
care after achieving permanency, as payments did not restart. Some argued this 
led to a perverse incentive not to achieve permanency, as providers were paid as 
long as children were on their caseload. Therefore, payments changed again in 
2005, and became outcomes based. Payments declined the longer a child 
remained in care, in order to incentivise more rapid permanency – so payments 
are 100 per cent for the first 6 months, 66 per cent for the next 6 months, then 
 32 
 
29 per cent for 12 months or more. No payments are made if the child returns 
to care within 12 months after being placed in a permanent placement, and 
providers have to give this service free of charge, to reduce incentives for poorly 
planned placements which may break down quickly. 
Evidence from the UK shows that there are further benefits to payment 
according to outcomes. One example of an outcomes-based payment 
mechanism is a social impact bond (SIB), in which non-statutory investors pay 
for a set of interventions (by a non-statutory provider) to bring about a positive 
outcome that is of interest to a government commissioner. If the outcome 
improves, the commissioner repays the investors for the initial investment, and 
sometimes a further financial return. 
In early 2014, Manchester City Council launched its MTFC [multidimensional 
treatment foster care] SIB, aimed at improving outcomes for looked-after 
children in residential care, and those in foster placements at risk of entering 
residential care. Since their investment depends on the project securing positive 
outcomes, investors have been incentivised to donate money and training 
(separate from their investment) to improve data collection procedures. A 
representative of the project from Manchester City Council told us: 
The investor has an interest, a very live interest, in knowing how this is 
performing… The investors have learned from it, putting extra money of 
their own into data collection and training to both the provider and 
ourselves [Manchester City Council] to provide information. 
SIBs are therefore one way of overcoming the cost and training barriers faced by 
local authorities and others, which may prevent them from collecting outcomes 
data. Like SIBs, the Children’s Social Care Innovation Programme is facilitating 
the collection of outcomes data by evaluating all the projects being funded, 
using 25 partner organisations and a steering group (results are to be published 
in September 2016). Furthermore, there may be spillover effects, as local 
authorities and providers are able to use their new skills to improve data 
collection in other areas – such as costs and populations: ‘It’s been beneficial on 
a much bigger scale than just this one intervention,’ said a representative from 
Manchester City Council. 
Despite the various benefits of outcomes-based payment mechanisms, there are 
drawbacks to their use. First, paying mostly or completely according to 
outcomes presents serious risks to providers. However good a service is, it may 
not promote positive outcomes for all children and young people as these 
outcomes are partially beyond the control of providers (as discussed above). 
Under outcomes-based payments, providers risk failing on the basis of factors 
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beyond their control. An unintended consequence of increased risk would be 
that providers become less innovative, as innovation would be a further risk that 
they would feel unable to justify. Furthermore, if too many providers fail then it 
becomes more difficult for local authorities to ensure there are sufficient 
placements for the children in their area who need them. Because of these risks, 
it would be unwise to make payments mostly or wholly depending on 
outcomes. This view is endorsed by a sector expert: 
It would neither be sensible nor desirable to contract entirely for outcomes, 
but there may be a small measure – say 10 per cent overall – could be 
based on an outcome measure. 
 
Box 6 Outsourcing – what can be achieved? 
Joint commissioning of children’s services and education services for children with 
complex needs  
Six councils – Oxfordshire County Council, Buckinghamshire County Council, Milton 
Keynes Council, Reading Borough Council, Bracknell Forest Borough Council and 
Hertfordshire County Council – collaborated, with the following results: 
 The six councils procured a single contract to provide services for children and 
young people with high cost, complex needs. By joining together, the councils 
were able to guarantee a minimum of 20 places for five years, so providers were 
able to lower their prices. 
 There was a cost saving of £2.5 million across six councils per year. The cost of 
each placement was reduced by approximately £500 per week.51 
Redesigning commissioning practices: option appraisal  
Devon County Council introduced an option appraisal model to commission 
placements, whereby social workers specify the needs and desired outcomes of a child 
in a document, which is sent to providers. Providers express an interest, detailing the 
package of support they will offer. A multi-agency team reviews each proposal with 
reference to the five Every Child Matters outcomes. Price is only factored in after this 
appraisal has taken place and unsuitable proposals excluded.  
This option appraisal model has had the following results: 
 Over the first four years, around £2 million in savings were achieved. 
 There has been a fourfold increase in placement choice and significant 
improvement in placement stability.52 
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3 PITFALLS TO AVOID 
In this chapter we consider three potential pitfalls identified when outsourcing 
children’s services: underfunding, using outsourcing only as a response to 
failure, and poor planning.  
Underfunding 
The financial outlook 
It is no secret that local authorities have been hit with massive budget cuts since 
the 2008 financial crash. As outlined in the introduction, local authorities have 
thus far managed to protect children’s social care from the brunt of the cuts. 
Despite the protection, spending has still fallen by a significant amount: from 
£2.58 billion in 2011/12 to £2.12 billion in 2014/15 – a cut of 18 per cent.53 The 
picture looks set to become worse given the continued budget cuts being faced 
by local authorities, whose officers have said that they cannot continue to 
protect children’s social care, and other high cost functions, to the extent that 
they have been able to this far. Britain’s planned exit from the EU is likely to 
exacerbate financial pressures, and will at a minimum make financial planning 
more difficult in the short term, as the full effects of our exit are at this stage 
unknown.  
The impact of budget cuts on children’s services 
The inevitable result of budget cuts is that local authorities have less money to 
fund services. But more than that, budget cuts fundamentally alter the way that 
local authorities use their remaining funds. In some cases, the result of this 
change is better outcomes for children and families, as local authorities learn 
how to do more with less, delivering greater value for money while maintaining 
high quality services. But in most cases we have seen, budget cuts have made 
the already complex process of commissioning even more difficult, to the 
detriment of children and families throughout the country. Ultimately, 
commissioning can enable the public sector to do more with less, but in these 
conditions it cannot do it all. In our survey of leading independent providers, we 
asked whether delivering high quality services had become more challenging, 
less challenging or had remained equally challenging since 2010. All 
respondents said that it had become more challenging.  
Our purpose here is not to deride local authorities. Commissioning is a difficult 
process in the best of times, let alone in the context of massive budget cuts. 
Indeed, during our evidence-gathering process, we encountered a great deal of 
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sympathy for local authority staff from a range of stakeholders. One 
independent provider told us: 
I don’t think local authorities are in a position to provide what they would 
like to provide any more. It’s very much just a situation of what they are 
physically able to or what they can. 
The core of the problem is that decreased budgets create a price-driven 
environment. Commissioners are forced to make decisions based not on quality, 
and on securing good outcomes for children and young people in their care, 
but on price. Furthermore, data collection is often one of the first activities to be 
cut when budgets are tight, so commissioners are not able to understand the 
real costs involved in prioritising price above outcomes and cannot make 
evidence-based decisions. The loss of focus on outcomes also poisons 
commissioners’ relationships with independent providers. In the following 
section we explore these impacts in further detail, and look at how budget cuts 
are ultimately putting the lives of children and young people at risk.  
The effect of cuts on relationships 
Some children’s services departments have been forced to reduce their staff 
numbers in order to make cost savings. Even in those that have not made 
reductions, increased demand has resulted in staff capacity becoming 
overstretched. This has led to vastly increased caseloads, less time to spend on 
each case, and less capacity for strategic planning.  
The fact that local authority staff are overstretched and under-resourced has 
harmed commissioner–provider relationships. As evidenced in chapter 2, strong 
commissioner–provider relationships are commonly a feature of successful 
outsourcing. We heard from some providers who said that local authorities have 
called on them to help with strategic planning, as a result of the pressures they 
faced. But in most cases, in the age of austerity commissioners and other local 
authority staff have not had sufficient time to foster relationships with providers, 
as noted by a survey respondent:  
There has been significant turnover of staff and workforce reductions in 
most LAs which has limited the amount of time commissioners tend to 
have to engage and partner with the market. 
There have been several consequences of this: first, it has made assessment and 
referral processes more difficult, as commissioners have less time for them, and 
each party knows less about what the other party needs or provides. In response 
to a question asking for survey respondents to identify the key impacts budget 
cuts had had on their ability to deliver services, one independent provider said: 
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LAs unable to provide professionals to attend regulatory meetings and thus 
support or action assessment, intervention. 
Second, it has made strategic commissioning more difficult, as providers are 
often excluded from the process. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it has 
reduced trust. Local authority staff, commissioners and providers alike know that 
they are corporate parents to some of the most vulnerable children and young 
people in the country. Where one party perceives the other to be compromising 
quality for cost, tensions arise. Many interviewees expressed not just frustration 
but deep worries that the system was moving away from its focus on the needs 
of the child. 
The drive to use in-house services 
Faced with the prospect of financial retrenchment, and without credible cost 
comparisons by which to judge in-house services and non-state providers, it is 
feasible that local authorities would consider altering their use of outsourcing in 
two ways:  
 increase their use of outsourcing, in the belief that there are cost savings to 
be made through this strategy 
 seek to decrease their use of outsourcing, under the perception that non-
state providers have higher costs than in-house services 
Outsourcing in general has increased over the past five to ten years, in particular 
with the introduction of the austerity programme. This trend looks set to 
continue, as noted in Deloitte’s report The State of the State 2015–16:  
Governments around the world are watching as it [the UK’s public sector] 
seeks to carve out a more affordable model for the modern state… Growth 
in the volume and value of services contracted out will continue to be 
rapid.54 
Nevertheless, in a small-scale qualitative study, carried out in one locality in 
England between September 2011 and January 2012, Dr Clive Sellick found that 
all but one of the six independent and voluntary sector fostering providers he 
researched had experienced a sharp reduction in referrals after the 2010 
October Spending Review.55  
We found evidence that the reaction of local authorities to the financial crisis 
has been polarised, at least with regard to children’s services. Some have 
pursued innovative new ways of delivering services, which have included, in 
many cases, an increased reliance on outsourcing. But we also found evidence 
similar to Dr Sellick’s that some local authorities have sought to deliver more 
services in-house. A sector expert observed: 
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LAs seem to know they need a mixed economy. However, the practice of 
going about generating it varies vastly from LA to LA; some seem to treat 
the independent sector as an irritation that they will use as a last resort and 
some will treat it as a great service that they must use more. 
The reason behind this polarisation is lack of data. Local authorities have 
radically different understandings of the relative costs of in-house and 
independent services, because most lack data and base their understandings on 
guesswork. This is particularly the case in the context of budget cuts, when local 
authorities do not feel justified in spending money on collecting data and staff 
have little time to analyse them. 
Using independent providers much less frequently can backfire on local 
authorities. We heard evidence of local authorities going to great lengths to 
avoid placing children and young people with independent providers. The 
subsequent placements were often unsuitable for the child, resulting in the 
placement breaking down. Only at this point did the local authority put the 
referral out to independent providers. And by this point, having experienced a 
placement breakdown (or often multiple breakdowns), the child’s needs had 
become more complex. Thus, local authority behaviour has partly driven the rise 
in more complex cases – this has done little to improve commissioner–provider 
relationships. 
The effect of cuts on the range of placements available  
In a time of increasing demand for placements for children and young people 
with more complex needs, changing commissioning practices are reducing the 
pool of placements available for this group, and standardising the service 
provided. One of the survey respondents observed: 
Cuts have also worked to standardise expected services. This is no more 
apparent than in foster care where the majority of frameworks are based 
on ‘standard’ placements. The unintended consequence of this has been 
that specialist care services, which we are seeing more of late, have been 
sidelined within commissioning approaches.  
An independent provider agreed: 
The fact that you have a standard option placement is where 
commissioners will start. And then there will be lots of to-ing and fro-ing 
and discussion about whether or not that young person actually has the 
needs that will meet the definition of ‘standard. 
Local authorities, seeking to make cost savings, are favouring the 
commissioning of standard, ‘no frills’ placements, instead of bespoke 
placements, or placements with greater packages of support attached. This 
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demonstrates a loss of sight on outcomes. The result has been the creation of a 
race to the bottom among providers, which are developing fewer services to 
meet the needs of children and young people with more complex needs, for 
whom the standard placements are inappropriate. As there are fewer 
placements available for children and young people with complex needs 
(including SEND), and because there are increasing numbers of children and 
young people in this group, providers are having to turn down an increasing 
proportion of referrals, for fear of being unable to accommodate their needs. An 
independent provider told us: 
For providers to take risks, they have to be confident that they can ably 
support their carers and they can ably care for that young person, and 
unfortunately on standard fees you can’t always be sure you can do that. 
Independent providers are being further discouraged from expanding their offer 
by the wider effects of austerity. For instance, increases in the cost of living and 
stagnant wages make the day-to-day costs of being a foster carer more 
expensive. These costs cannot be met by foster carers, nor are they met by the 
local authority, so they must be absorbed by providers. A survey respondent 
spoke about the increasingly difficulty in keeping costs at an acceptable level: 
 [The] uneven playing field between independent and maintained sector 
appears to be increasing. [It is] very difficult to keep costs at an acceptable 
level as LAs are struggling for funds. 
Providers are also now required to pay their residential home staff more as a 
result of the introduction of the living wage, further decreasing profit margins. 
Decreased profit margins make it riskier for providers (particularly small 
providers) to enter new areas and expand their businesses. 
Using outsourcing only in the context of failure 
Outsourcing has been seen by some as an appropriate response to failure. It has 
been a favoured method of intervention in the US. For example, in Kansas, the 
change of system was prompted by a lawsuit brought against the Department 
of SRS by the American Civil Liberties Union, which highlighted excessively large 
caseloads and inadequate monitoring of children. The case was settled in 1993, 
on the agreement that the child welfare system would undergo significant 
reform – hence the move to outsource.56  
Externalisation as an alternative to outsourcing 
In contrast to the US experience, the most frequent response to persistent or 
systemic failure in children’s services in England and Wales is, currently, the 
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creation of an independent trust – an exercise in externalisation, rather than 
outsourcing. In Putting Children First, the government makes a clear 
commitment to ‘supporting new organisational models’, and states its ambition 
that by 2020 a third of all local authorities will deliver their children’s services 
through a new model or be actively working towards a new model. The report 
presents trusts as a prime example of a new model, and praises them for 
marking a ‘new stage in innovation and improvement’.57 However, the evidence 
on the effectiveness of trusts is contested, with the House of Commons 
Education Committee saying that there has not been adequate evaluation, and 
urging the government to undertake a full evaluation before expanding the 
model any further.58  
Why have policy makers in England and Wales seen externalisation as the first-
line response to failure, rather than outsourcing? Sir Julian Le Grand, prominent 
academic and expert of public sector reform, was able to shed some light on 
this issue in his report to the Secretary of State for Education on the way 
forward for Doncaster’s children’s services. According to Le Grand, Doncaster’s 
children’s services were being held back from improving by two key things: its 
association with past failures, and the constraints imposed by the bureaucracy 
of the council. Retaining children’s services as a council function but requiring 
the department to make greater use of outsourcing would have solved neither 
of those problems. It was removing children’s services from local authority 
control that Le Grand et al believed would make the crucial difference: 
We have argued that it is the cultural legacy of failure in Doncaster, as well 
as the interaction with the council’s other difficulties and challenges, that is 
the fundamental problem with children’s services, not just the absence of 
good leaders or managers. If this is accepted, then the need is for some 
form of re-organisation of the structure and governance of children’s 
services: one that marks a decisive break with the past. There needs to be a 
line drawn under the historic failure: a separation that permits the 
development of a new culture – one of development, improvement and 
innovation, instead of one of frustration, disillusion and stagnation.59 
A service that has been externalised has greater freedoms than its predecessor. 
Often, there is also a new energy and culture: a willingness to do things 
differently and a determination to make the most of the opportunity and get 
things right. A representative from an independent trust told us: 
I think the move to something like this is very, very positive. When you’ve 
got an endemic problem, and one that’s been intractable within the local 
authority, I think there are times when you mustn’t underestimate the value 
of a fresh start… for the staff themselves, you say, ‘Right, this is a fresh start, 
we’re going to do it a different way and we’re going to make it right.’ 
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Using externalisation as a platform to outsource 
Where responsibility for strategic commissioning is handed from the local 
authority to the trust, the trust has sole control over outsourcing. Given the 
freedom and energy within a newly created independent trust, some might 
argue it is the ideal time to re-think relationships with independent providers, 
and look to improve or increase the use of their services.  
However, we found significant evidence to suggest that reviewing outsourcing 
arrangements should not be a priority in the context of failure. The same 
independent trust representative as the one quoted above told us: 
It’s complicated because so much needs to be done, and when I first 
looked at this I wondered if we could do something more creative quite 
quickly, around our relationships with the independent agencies, and look 
at a way of letting single points at a better rate, but once we got in there’s 
just so much else that’s so messy, we ended up thinking [we’d] put that on 
the back burner for the moment.  
Commissioning is very difficult to get right. It is a particularly underdeveloped 
field in relation to children’s social care. In his review of residential care, Sir 
Martin reports, ‘I was often told, by those with experience of both, that 
commissioning in children’s services has not generally matured as much as in 
adult social care.’60 The difficulties of commissioning services for children and 
young people was recognised by the introduction of the Commissioning 
Support Programme in 2008, which offered flexible support to local authorities 
designed to help them improve outcomes for children, young people and 
families. One of our survey respondents lamented the government’s decision to 
close the programme in 2013:  
Commissioning itself is under-supported compared to arrangements circa 
2008 when the DCSF [Department for Children, Schools and Families, now 
DfE] provided significant training and development tools through the now 
defunct Commissioning Programme.  
Not only is commissioning difficult, but it is time-consuming, requiring the 
attention of senior managers. For this reason, it may be considered one of the 
‘two edged swords’ described in a recent report61 – a project that may reap 
great rewards, but that could prove damaging if staff become over-committed 
to making it work, at the risk of losing focus on other priorities. And when a 
local authority or trust is fire-fighting, there are many other priorities that need 
their attention. This is not to say that trusts should not consider reviewing or 
increasing their outsourcing arrangements – just that they might not necessarily 
do so straight away, if there are more urgent issues at hand.  
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This raises the question: when is an ideal time to outsource, if not in the context 
of failure? We believe that not enough attention has been paid to how 
outsourcing can be used to the benefit of local authorities already performing 
relatively well. Why not use innovative methods of service delivery to prevent 
local authorities from getting to crisis point in the first place, rather than saving 
those methods until they are already at that point? In the discussion of 
supporting organisational change in Putting Children First, the government 
indicates that over time it would like the balance of activity to shift away from 
intervening where there is failure to supporting the spread of excellence62 – but 
the question is whether structural change helps a failing local authority in the 
first place. In contrast, a local authority already performing well would be able to 
ensure it has a plan in place for developing relationships, gathering data and 
clarifying outcomes before the outsourcing process began, unlike a local 
authority in crisis. Indeed, ensuring one has all of these things (good 
relationships, clear outcomes and data) can help deliver better children’s 
services, regardless of whether one plans to outsource or not. Having these in 
place also increases the chance of avoiding another big pitfall should one then 
choose to outsource.  
Poor planning 
Any change to service delivery methods presents risks, and it is all the more 
important to minimise those risks when providing services for highly vulnerable 
groups, such as children. Therefore, a decision to substantially increase the use 
of independent providers should mark the start of a long period of planning, 
piloting and transitioning to the new system. It is inevitable that a move to a 
new system will present a degree of turbulence and disruption, as all parties 
involved adjust to new ways of working and different divisions of roles and 
responsibilities – but good planning minimises the impact of this disruption on 
children and families.  
Prior planning 
There are a number of essential activities that must take place in the planning 
period, before the piloting and transition starts. These include defining 
outcomes and designing contracts, and developing oversight mechanisms 
based on an accurate understanding of costs and outcomes. Also, existing 
services (by the local authority and non-state providers) must be mapped and 
assessed, in order to identify any gaps in provision and give providers the time 
to build capacity. Aside from these crucial elements that need to be prepared, 
there are some less obvious activities that need to begin from the very start of 
the planning process: developing relationships with the wider community (as 
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emphasised in chapter 2) and developing a data collection system. The data 
collection system needs to be ready to use from the start of the piloting and 
transition periods, so that monitoring can take place during these periods. 
Piloting and transition 
Ideally, planning should be followed by a piloting period. This is a helpful time 
in which the various systems and arrangements prepared during the planning 
period can be tested, including the readiness and capacity of providers, and 
payment mechanisms. Data collection systems may need to be tweaked during 
the pilots, in response to feedback from providers.  
It is crucially important to put in place a transition period to act as a buffer when 
moving from the old system to the new. This gives providers the support and 
time they need to iron out any issues they face when taking on a higher volume 
of cases than they have before. In order for the transition period to be a help 
rather than a hindrance, all parties need to be aware of what their exact roles 
and responsibilities are – something which should have been decided and 
publicised during or after the pilots. 
The need for a cautious transition is well supported by the international 
evidence. Kansas implemented its new system over two years with no pilots, 
transition period or clear plan. Independent providers did not have time to build 
their capacity, resulting in a shortage of services, and there was a great deal of 
confusion regarding roles and responsibilities. Staff turnover reached 50 per 
cent in some new agencies as workloads increased.  
Learning from the mistakes made in Kansas, Florida took a phased approach, 
beginning with piloting, which led into a gradual transition over five years. All 
contracts included a start-up period of 12–18 months so agencies could build 
their capacity. During this time, agencies were also tasked with meeting a series 
of deliverables, including plans for systems of care, network development, 
quality assurance, and fiscal and risk management. The state developed a 
readiness assessment tool, and a formal process for assessing and preparing in-
house teams and providers to transition services safely. The preparation resulted 
in much less turbulence for children and families. Nevertheless, the process was 
not flawless – the online data collection system used by providers to record their 
outcomes was flawed, leading to inconsistencies in the way that different 
providers collected their information. As a result the state could not monitor 
performance accurately.  
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The risk of losing momentum during planning 
If a lengthy transition period is put in place, it may be tempting to think that 
some preparatory work can be left until the transition has begun. But the 
evidence from Kansas and Florida suggests that the more successful transitions 
are those in which major preparatory work is carried out before piloting even 
begins. However, the flipside of taking a slow and cautious approach is that 
momentum might be lost. Take Washington as an example. Washington passed 
legislation in 2009 requiring the child welfare system to be reformed in a two 
stage process. Stage 1 involved making existing contracts performance based, 
and reducing the number of contracts. Stage 2 was set to consist of two pilot 
sites, to compare case management by state services and private services. 
Originally tabled to start in June 2012, stage 2 has still not commenced – having 
been met with disapproval by state employees and potential bidders. 
Furthermore, the Transformation Committee leading the transition faced an 
injunction and was suspended for a period of years. Those driving the reforms 
knew that it was important to undertake preparatory work before beginning the 
transition to the new system, but they have also learned that doing so has its 
own risks: you may hit stumbling blocks that severely delay the transition from 
going ahead. 
The risk of ‘seizing the moment’ 
There are times when it might be tempting to undergo a rapid reform of 
children’s services in a given area. This might be in the context of failure 
(although we made the case above that outsourcing is not the default solution 
to failure) or when the policy environment looks as if it might support and 
enable reform – the temptation is to ‘seize the moment’. The current SEND 
reforms might be considered an opportunity to get commissioning right for 
children and young people with SEND. Indeed, the time is ripe for discussions 
Box 7 Children’s services in Florida 
Florida’s liberalisation was also a response to failure. In the mid-1990s, staff at the 
Florida Department of Children and Families (DCF) were being overwhelmed by 
large caseloads and high-profile child deaths. In 1996 the legislature mandated the 
DCF to establish five pilot programmes. Although four of the five programmes 
failed, the state pressed ahead with state-wide outsourcing. By March 2005, the 
process was complete – 20 lead agencies managed 500 subcontractors, who 
together provided welfare services for tens of thousands of children. The system has 
shown significant improvement. The number of children in out-of-home care 
decreased by 38 per cent between 2005 and 2009, and in 2012 Florida scored very 
highly on the Right for Kids Ranking. 
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about how commissioning might be used differently to support the SEND 
reforms. But policy makers and practitioners must be aware that in order for any 
reforms to succeed, planning time is needed, and the results will not be seen for 
years to come. This planning time is particularly crucial for services for children 
and young people with SEND as the SEND reforms will remain in a state of 
transition until the end of 2018, and further reform in this period would not be 
feasible.  
  
 45 
 
4 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Outsourcing has the potential to boost outcomes for vulnerable children and 
young people across the country, but it needs to be done in the correct way, or 
it can have the opposite effect. In this chapter we present five recommendations 
based on the critical success factors and pitfalls we have identified, which will 
help policy makers and practitioners to exploit the benefits of outsourcing while 
minimising the risks. 
For policy makers 
1. Local authorities and central government should adopt an ‘outcomes-first’ 
approach, according to which outsourcing is seen not as a way of 
responding to failure or cutting costs, but as a way to improve outcomes 
in a planned and strategic manner. 
National guidance on when outsourcing is advisable must change. Currently, 
outsourcing and externalisation are presented in national guidance and policy 
as responses to failure. But we have shown that outsourcing may not be the 
best way of responding to failure or cutting costs, and that using outsourcing in 
these circumstances may certainly undermine its effectiveness. For the purpose 
of responding to failure, measures such as mentoring, performance 
management and a longer-term review of outsourcing processes may be more 
appropriate. Furthermore, outsourcing can be greatly beneficial to local 
authorities that are not failing, but are attempting to improve outcomes. Local 
authorities in these circumstances have more time to plan the outsourcing 
process, maximising its chances of success. Therefore, national guidance should 
present outsourcing and externalisation as tools to be used as part of an 
improvement process, and only one way of responding to failure (and very 
possibly not the best way).  
Nevertheless, we recognise that given current pressures and policy direction, it 
is likely that some local authorities will be required to outsource rapidly in the 
context of a perceived failure.63 There are measures that can be taken to 
improve the chances of success. First, expertise from elsewhere can be 
parachuted in to enable the local authority to learn from others where 
outsourcing has been successful. Those experts might also be able to share 
preparatory materials and processes that worked for them, reducing the time 
needed for transition. Second, the local authority might be supported by being 
incorporated into a consortium. The failing local authority could benefit from 
the expertise of better-performing local authorities in the consortium, and 
would be required to do less work themselves (eg by joining an existing 
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fostering framework). However, for this to work the consortium must be well 
matched (as we discuss in chapter 3). 
David Cameron indicated that failing local authorities will be subject to 
takeovers by successful local authorities. Like the House of Commons Education 
Committee, we are sceptical about whether such intervention would help the 
failing local authority to improve standards. Children’s services are highly locally 
variable and require deep local knowledge, strong relationships and delicate 
local planning – something another local authority coming in and taking over 
wholesale might struggle to achieve. A failing local authority can certainly gain 
insight and expertise from those that are more successful, through partnering, 
mentoring or in larger consortia. For this reason, we support the government’s 
Partners in Practice initiative, which will aim to boost sector-led improvement. 
But removing a failing local authority from its own responsibilities seems to miss 
out on an important developmental and learning process. The failing local 
authority needs to be helped to stand on its own two feet, so to speak, and 
improve standards in its particular area. It is encouraging that Greening has 
granted Dudley Council and Norfolk County Council, both judged ‘inadequate’ 
by Ofsted, more time to improve, heeding the advice of the government-
appointed commissioners.64  
2. The government should bring back the Commissioning Support 
Programme. 
We echo Sir Martin’s recommendation that improving local and regional 
commissioning skills must be an early priority.65 To this end, the government 
should bring back the Commissioning Support Programme. The programme 
was jointly funded by the DfE and Department of Health from November 2008 
to March 2011, then became independently run until it ceased operations at the 
end of 2013. The programme gave commissioners the support they needed to 
learn from the latest developments in commissioning, continually refresh their 
skills and gain from other’s insights and advice. It was widely used and 
recognised as a valuable resource. Four out of five commissioners surveyed in a 
report by PricewaterhouseCoopers at the end of the second year of the 
programme were aware of its core services, and a third felt that it had had an 
impact on outcomes for children and young people. The bespoke support 
offered by the programme was particularly valued: three-quarters of 
commissioners who had used bespoke support felt it had enhanced skills and 
knowledge in their local area.66  
At a time when greater responsibility is being placed on local authorities not to 
deliver services but to shape, plan and facilitate them, effective commissioning 
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is one of the central skills local authorities now need to hold. Commissioning is 
an art, not a science – there are no simple rules that can be followed. Instead, 
the commissioner must use a range of skills in order to increase the chances of 
success. These include technical skills, such as being able to make sense of data, 
but also soft skills, such as being able to build relationships with diverse 
stakeholders. Such complex and high stakes decision-making processes need 
continued support. While bringing back a programme like this requires 
investment by the government, improving commissioning skills would generate 
significant savings.  
There is some planned support for commissioners. For example, the recently 
announced Government Outcomes Lab, a partnership between the Cabinet 
Office and the Blavatnik School of Government at the University of Oxford, will 
support local commissioners in understanding and developing SIBs.67 But SIBs 
are not appropriate in all circumstances. There needs to be wider support 
available to commissioners, and the Commissioning Support Programme has an 
excellent track-record in providing flexible support based on local need.  
For policy makers and practitioners 
3. A new national children’s social care forum should be created to bring 
people together to identify new strategies to support the development of 
high quality children’s services.  
A new national children’s social care forum is needed, with a wide membership 
comprising social care leaders and professionals, commissioners, providers, and 
children and families.  
The forum would have two key purposes. First, it would bring people together 
to help develop outcomes-based strategies. In order to maximise the benefits of 
outsourcing, commissioners need to be ambitious in their approach to using 
outcomes – measuring and monitoring outcomes is a good place to start, but 
commissioning and paying according to outcomes can bring far more 
significant benefits. Developing outcomes-based strategies is complex, so a 
forum is needed to bring together those involved in the process to share 
expertise. Second, the forum would help to identify ways of cutting costs while 
maintaining quality and promoting innovation. Budget cuts often lead 
commissioners to make knee-jerk decisions that do not ultimately result in cost 
savings. A forum would enable those involved in commissioning to learn from 
each other’s experiences, helping to prevent short-termist attempts to cut costs. 
The forum would have the additional benefit of helping to build relationships 
among the diverse range of professionals involved in children’s social care. 
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Similar bodies already exist in other areas. For example, the National Market 
Development Forum (NMDF) leads improvements in the adult social care sector, 
working specifically to strengthen the evidence base and capacity for excellence 
in person-centred commissioning. Representatives from across the sector attend 
meetings, and resources aimed at improving market relationships have been 
produced and shared on the NMDF website.68 In the area of children’s health, 
there is the Children and Young People’s Health Outcomes Forum (CYPHOF), an 
advisory group that aims to identify the health outcomes that matter most for 
children and young people, and to raise the key issues that need to be 
addressed to achieve these outcomes.69 Like the NMDF, the CYPHOF group 
brings together representatives from across the sector and produces reports 
advising government on how to improve health outcomes for children and 
young people.70 These bodies can be used to aid the design of a new forum for 
children’s social care.  
For practitioners  
4. Each local authority should facilitate a community-led exercise, in which 
local stakeholders define what desired outcomes ought to be for looked-
after children and children with complex needs in their area.  
As we have seen, a focus on outcomes is critical to good commissioning. It is 
also important to engage the wider community when making changes to the 
way children’s services are delivered. We believe that local authorities 
attempting to enhance their focus on outcomes and to improve their 
engagement with the wider community can fulfil both of these objectives at the 
same time, by calling on community members to help them define outcomes. 
The new What Works Centre could play a role in guiding local conversations 
such as these. 
In order for this exercise to be a success, it would need to involve a wide range 
of stakeholders: commissioners (for both children’s services and other local 
authority services), operations staff (again, for children’s services and others), 
independent providers, children and families (those already in contact with 
children’s services and those who are not), and members of the wider 
community including charitable organisations and local interested groups. 
Defining outcomes is a complex task: the process would benefit from the 
viewpoints of a diverse range of stakeholders. Being inclusive is also important 
in ensuring that the process is transparent, credible and legitimate.  
Providing that a wide range of stakeholders engage, and that the process is 
genuinely collaborative, there will be two key benefits at the end of the exercise. 
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First, relationships between all parties involved will be improved. Participants will 
be able to put names to faces, and will have a greater understanding of each 
other’s viewpoints. These relationships are critical for children’s services to work 
well, as their success depends on the support of a range of other departments, 
organisations and community members. Second, it would create a cohering 
vision and mission for all those involved in children’s services to strive towards. 
They would be able to make decisions knowing clearly what they are meant to 
be achieving, and would feel invested in making the system a success given 
their role in articulating what success looks like.  
5. Local authorities should prioritise data collection on outcomes, costs and 
demographic projections of their children’s population irrespective of 
whether plans are in place to outsource or externalise children’s services 
Evidence shows that commissioners who make strategic use of data tend to 
secure better outcomes for the children and young people in their area than 
those who do not. This includes data about: 
 populations, so commissioners can plan strategically and ensure the right 
number and kind of placements 
 costs, so that commissioners know how much their contracts are worth 
and can pay providers accordingly 
 the outcomes achieved by children and young people, so that 
commissioners can measure and monitor performance 
However, it is also important for local authorities that have no plans to 
outsource or externalise their children’s services to collect data in these three 
areas. Understanding their local population and future demographic projections, 
having clarity of outcomes and knowing how much their services cost to provide 
all enable local authorities to deliver more effective in-house children’s services. 
This is because local authorities are better able to target limited resources and 
make strategic decisions on (for example) placement stability if they are armed 
with this intelligence. Further, should outsourcing become an option later, local 
authorities have a much better grasp of the sorts of services they need and what 
value for money ‘looks like’ in their area, making the commissioning process far 
smoother for all concerned. 
The expense needed to collect and collate the data, and expertise needed to 
analyse them, cannot be underestimated – nonetheless the evidence is 
compelling that decision making in children’s services based on robust data can 
generate significant cost savings even in the short term. 
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5 CONCLUSION 
Outsourcing is a tool that can be used to improve outcomes significantly – but 
only in the right hands, and in the right context. It is a delicate process that 
requires great skill from commissioners, who must be properly supported to 
succeed. Outsourcing is all the more challenging for high stakes service areas 
such as children’s services. Given the vulnerability of looked-after children and 
children with SEND, outsourcing can generate public opposition and local 
authority resistance, particularly when for-profit providers make up a substantial 
part of the market.  
Nevertheless, it is an inescapable and widely recognised fact that in many areas 
children’s services are currently not meeting expected standards, and it is likely 
that funding pressures on local authorities will remain for the foreseeable future 
– and perhaps increase as a result of Britain leaving the EU. The solution cannot 
be just to plough more money into the system. We need to think about how we 
can innovate to achieve more with less, encourage professional creativity and 
diversify provision types to respond to changing demographics. Outsourcing 
can help to achieve all of these aims – but only when relationships are strong, 
when data are used effectively, and when outcomes are clearly defined and 
worked towards. The traps of underfunding, poor planning and using 
outsourcing simply as a response to failure must be avoided. 
The recommendations we have presented are designed to maximise the 
benefits of outsourcing and to minimise the risks. But commissioning is a 
complex art – there is no single bullet-proof plan to follow, and the risks can 
only be minimised, not removed altogether. Everyone involved in 
commissioning and delivering children’s services needs to share knowledge, 
support each other, and work to cultivate better understanding and support 
from others, with the particular aim of developing an outcomes-based 
approach. Current government policy might make this a difficult task: the loss of 
policy attention and possibly funding associated with Britain’s departure from 
the EU, planned budget cuts, using outsourcing primarily as a means of 
punishing failure, allowing local authorities to take over others, and scrapping 
the Commissioning Support Programme – all of this prevents commissioners 
from focusing on outcomes and developing their skills, to the detriment of the 
vulnerable children and young people in their care. A more positive, proactive 
approach to commissioning, making it part of a collaborative and outcomes-
based improvement process, is the only sustainable way of improving children’s 
services country-wide against a backdrop of dwindling resources and growing 
demand.
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worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive, perpetual (for the duration of the applicable 
copyright) licence to exercise the rights in the Work as stated below:  
a  to reproduce the Work, to incorporate the Work into one or more Collective Works, 
License to Publish 
68 
 
and to reproduce the Work as incorporated in the Collective Works; 
b  to distribute copies or phonorecords of, display publicly, perform publicly, and 
perform publicly by means of a digital audio transmission the Work including as 
incorporated in Collective Works; The above rights may be exercised in all media and 
formats whether now known or hereafter devised. The above rights include the right to 
make such modifications as are technically necessary to exercise the rights in other 
media and formats. All rights not expressly granted by Licensor are hereby reserved. 
 
4 Restrictions 
The licence granted in Section 3 above is expressly made subject to and limited  by the 
following restrictions: 
a You may distribute, publicly display, publicly perform, or publicly digitally perform 
the Work only under the terms of this Licence, and You must include a copy of, or the 
Uniform Resource Identifier for, this Licence with every copy or phonorecord of the Work 
You distribute, publicly display, publicly perform, or publicly digitally perform. You may 
not offer or impose any terms on the Work that alter or restrict the terms of this Licence 
or the recipients’ exercise of the rights granted here under. You may not sublicence the 
Work. You must keep intact all notices that refer to this Licence and to the disclaimer of 
warranties. You may not distribute, publicly display, publicly perform, or publicly digitally 
perform the Work with any technological measures that control access or use of the 
Work in a manner inconsistent with the terms of this Licence Agreement. The above 
applies to the Work as incorporated in a Collective Work, but this does not require the 
Collective Work apart from the Work itself to be made subject to the terms of this 
Licence. If You create a Collective Work, upon notice from any Licensor You must, to the 
extent practicable, remove from the Collective Work any reference to such Licensor or 
the Original Author, as requested. 
b You may not exercise any of the rights granted to You in Section 3 above in any 
manner that is primarily intended for or directed toward commercial advantage or 
private monetary compensation. The exchange of the Work for other copyrighted works 
by means of digital filesharing or otherwise shall not be considered to be intended for or 
directed toward commercial advantage or private monetary compensation, provided 
there is no payment of any monetary compensation in connection with the exchange of 
copyrighted works. 
 
License to Publish 
69 
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6 Limitation on Liability 
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7 Termination 
A  This Licence and the rights granted hereunder will terminate automatically upon any 
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distributing the Work at any time; provided, however that any such election will not 
serve to withdraw this Licence (or any other licence that has been, or is required to be, 
granted under the terms of this Licence), and this Licence will continue in full force and 
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